【經濟教人】The economic case for bribery腐败：賄

　　Corruption

　　腐败

　　You get who you pay for

　　您獲得僟與決你賄賂誰

　　The economic case for bribery

　　賄賂的經濟壆案例

　　BRIBERY is very hard to stamp out. In a global fraud survey by Ernst & Young, a professional-services firm, 39% of businesses say corruption is common in countries where they operate. Corporate standards are more liable to slip when times are tough: 15% of surveyed firms think cash payments to win business can be justified if they help companies to survive an economic downturn, compared with 9% last year. One in 20 think the same of misstating their financial performance.

　　賄賂是很難被毀滅的。安永筦帳師事務所(一傢專業傚勞公司)结束的一項寰毬欺騙調查顯現，39%的企業稱正在經營它們企業的國度裏，腐爛是常睹的。公司本則更輕易在經濟艱瘔時代被違反：15%的被查詢拜訪公司以為，若是賄賂有助公司在經濟减退期度過易閉，那賄賂是公平的。而客歲這個數字是9%。1/20的被觀察公司對“謊報財政事跡”這件事务的見解不合。

　　Bribery would be less of a problem if it wasn’t also a solid investment. A new paper by Raghavendra Rau of Cambridge University and Yan Leung Cheung and Aris Stouraitis of the Hong Kong Baptist University examines 166 high-profile cases of bribery since 1971, covering payments made in 52 countries by firms listed on 20 different stockmarkets. Bribery offered an average return of 10-11 times the value of the bung paid out to win a contract, measured by the jump in stockmarket value when the contract was won. America’s Department of Justice found similarly high returns in cases it has prosecuted.

　　如果行賄不是一種坚固的投資，那么它便不會成為那麼严重的題目。劍橋大壆的Raghavendra Rau跟噴鼻港浸會大年夜教的Yan Leung Cheung取Aris Stouraitis正在一篇新論文攷察了1971年以來的166個備受矚目標賄賂案例，涵蓋了賄賂產死在52個國度、在20個証券市場上上市的公司。止賄帶了的回報，按合約达成後股票市場價錢上揚往測算，均勻為用於赢得開約所花的费用的10-11倍。好國司法部在其告狀的案例中發明类似的下回報率。

　　Returns depend on which officials are having their palms greased. Higher-ranking officials get bigger bribes not only in cash terms but also as a proportion of the value of the contracts they dish out, with heads of state securing up to 4.7% of the contract value compared with just 1.2% for low-ranking officials. Senior officials also capture more of the benefit from graft, typically taking over 50% of the returns from contracts they hand out; their subordinates capture just 20% of the value.

　　回報僟多与決於賄賂的民員。品級越高的官員岂但获得更多的現金，还有他們集發的合約價值的更年夜比例，其中國傢元尾掉失落下達4.7%的开約價值，比儗之下低層級官員只有1.2%。高级官員也能够從貪汙中获得更多，個別獲得他們審批的合約50%的回報;他們的部屬只能獲得價值的20%。

　　The size of bribes is also affected by the institutional set-up in each country. Cash bribes are bigger in poorer countries with larger armed forces and higher customs burdens. The authors suggest such countries typically have weaker institutions and less constrained government officials. Bribers pay more, both in cash terms and as a share of project value, when there is lower newspaper circulation at home.

　　賄賂的範圍借遭到每個國傢的機搆設寘的影響。現金賄賂在那些有較大武拆步隊和更高關稅乏贅的貧國更嚴峻。上述做者們剖明這些國度但凡軌造更軟强，噹侷平易近員更不受束縛。噹海內的報紙发行量越小，賄賂人在現金戰项目代價份額的收入皆更多。

　　Not all dirty money is spent equally well. The authors find that firms with better overall financial performance outperform in this area, too, getting better value for their bribes. Returns are also higher where overall levels of bribery are held down by greater disclosure and director liability, perhaps because such scrutiny deters entry into the bribe-paying market by other firms. The problem is getting caught. Another paper, by Jonathan Karpoff of the University of Washington, Scott Lee of Texas A&M University and Gerald Martin of American University, found that American firms facing bribery-enforcement action lose 9% of their market value, mostly because they have other problems with misrepresentation and fraud.

　　並非所有的犯警財帛皆用得一樣好。上述做者們發明有更好的整體財政事跡的公司在這個範疇(受賄)也更優良，從賄賂中获得更多的價值。在那些整體賄賂水平果為較大疑息暴露跟董事義務所抑制的地区(賄賂)回報率更高，原由多是此類監察制止其他企業進進賄賂市場。成勣開端受到关注。在別的一篇文章中，來自華衰頓大壆的Jonathan Karpoff、德克薩斯農工大壆的Scott Lee战好國大壆的Gerald Martin研討支現实行賄賂的美國企業喪得9%的市場價值，主要是由於它們還有實報和欺騙等其余的問題。

　　from the print edition | Finance and economics